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1 Introduction
We take a portfolio view of sovereign credit default swaps (CDS), contributing to existing (and
extensive) pricing literature the natural extension from individual CDS instruments to portfo-
lios. Sovereign CDS are insurance contracts offering protection against default of a reference
sovereign. They emerged in the 1990s as a credit derivative security in the sovereign debt
market. Their raison d’être is to hedge and trade sovereign credit risks and they offer investors
the opportunity to take a view purely on credit. They are used by sovereign debt investors to
hedge credit events, whereas speculators take naked positions in these instruments—without
buying the underlying asset—to bet on the credit risk of the reference entity. Arbitrageurs
exploit price differences between the derivative and the underlying debt obligation(s) by
taking offsetting positions in the two.
Following standardization of CDS contracts in 1998–1999 and successful execution in
a few defaults—starting with Argentina in 2001—the market grew rapidly. Packer and
Suthiphongchai (2003) discuss the early developments and Fig. 1 illustrates the market growth
since 2005 when BIS started publishing data, showing notional amounts and gross market
value together with the number of dealers. Notional amounts provide a measure of market
size, but gross market values reflect the scale of risk transfer in the market. We observe a
significant increase in both the nominal amounts issued and the number of dealers in CDS
from 2005 until mid-2013, with a subsequent decline to 2010 levels. Much smaller, and with
smaller variation across time, are the gross amounts, indicating that the risk transfer function
of CDS remains steady whereas the speculative function of the markets fluctuates.
CDS have been criticized for facilitating market manipulations in the eurozone crisis, and
naked trading was banned by the German financial regulator in May 2010 and by the EU
since November 2012. However, a European Commission report (Criado et al. 2010) found no
apparent mis-pricing in the sovereign bond and CDS market. The empirical investigation of
this report finds “no conclusive evidence that CDS markets increase funding costs for Member
States”. More recently IMF (2013) presented evidence that also refutes the criticism against
Fig. 1 The growing market for sovereign credit default swaps. (Source: Bank for International Settlement
and authors’ calculations)
123
Ann Oper Res
their use and argues that CDS have contributed to the deepening and efficiency of the sovereign
markets. A nuanced view on the role of CDS in the crisis is given by Stulz (2010) who writes
“financial derivatives have clearly lost any presumption of innocence” but argues it would be
misguided “to turn 180 degrees from a presumption of innocence to a presumption of guilt”.
The CDS markets, the statistical properties of CDS spreads, spread returns and spread
term structures, the price discovery mechanisms, and market spillovers, have been studied
extensively. The lion’s share of research goes to corporate CDS, but attention turned recently
to the sovereign market as well. We do not review the extensive body of knowledge and refer
readers to the survey and discussion on future prospects by Augustin et al. (2014, 2016), and
the recent work on sovereign CDS by Fabozzi et al. (2016).
Conspicuously absent from the literature are studies of CDS in a portfolio context. This
is where our paper makes a contribution. It provides practical models for CDS investors,
establishes the validity of diversification in sovereign CDS markets, and validates the models
during the eurozone crisis. A related contribution is Giesecke et al. (2014) that also study
CDS portfolios using goal programming to address trading constraints faced by credit swap
investors, and illustrate their impact on optimal portfolios. Their paper and ours make comple-
mentary contributions and pave the way for further research in integrated enterprise-wide risk
management (Holmer and Zenios 1995) to incorporate CDS positions with the underlying
sovereign bonds in a diversified portfolio.
The motivation for our paper is coming from the following observations:
1. While CDS are typically bought to hedge against the default of a reference sovereign bond,
enterprise risk management requires sovereign bond investors to consider the insurance
needs of their whole portfolio. A silo approach to hedging, whereby CDS insurance is
bought for each bond separately, leads to over-insurance when entities are negatively
correlated. A portfolio approach is warranted.
2. A portfolio approach is also required for some aspects of EU regulation on CDS (European
Union 2012). The regulatory ban on naked positions does not apply if a CDS transaction
serves to hedge a long position in a portfolio of debt instruments highly correlated with a
reference sovereign bond. In this case the CDS holder is not hedging a specific sovereign
entity but their own portfolio, and a CDS portfolio may be (most likely, it will be) a better
hedge than a single contract.
3. Empirical research on sovereign CDS spread determinants finds considerable evidence
that a significant fraction of the fluctuations in sovereign CDS spreads is determined
by global factors, unrelated to a country’s economy, see, e.g., Longstaff et al. (2011)
(Augustin et al. 2014, Sect. 7.4). However, idiosyncratic risks remain—explaining 4–
43% of CDS return variation depending on country and time scale—and hence a portfolio
approach is useful in diversifying these risks. Our work provides normative models to
do so, and the application to eurozone core and periphery, and CESEE countries shows
that diversification pays.
4. Increased market liquidity, standardization of contracts and the shift from OTC deals
to exchange trades, facilitated the interest in CDS portfolio management. Hedge funds
made significant profits in the CDS markets. Napier Group, Saba and Blue Mountain are
funds quoted in Augustin et al. (2016) as benefiting from their CDS positions. Activist
shareholder Carl Icahn announced in November 2014 that he owns CDS on high yield
debt against the 5-year U.S. Treasury note and stated that “the risk-reward is great in that
CDS”.1
1 See REUTERS SUMMIT-Investors overpaying for yield after years of low rates, Thu. Nov. 20, 2014, http://
www.reuters.com/article/investment-yearend-yield-idUSL2N0T82YH20141120.
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5. The development of CDS indices provides benchmarks for CDS investment strategies.
See, for instance the Markit CDX family of tradeable CDS indices covering North Amer-
ica and emerging markets, and the S&P/ISDA CDS indices. Co-branding S&P CDS
indices jointly with the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) increases
transparency and efficiency in the derivatives market. S&P and ISDA currently offer the
S&P/ISDA Eurozone Developed Nation Sovereign CDS Index, among others, which we
use later to benchmark model performance.
The models developed in this paper are building blocks for implementing the strategies
of sovereign bond investors who buy CDS to hedge the credit risk of their portfolios, of
speculators that seek to exploit perceived credit risk opportunities from deterioration (by
going long) or improvement (by going short) of a sovereign’s credit rating, and of dealers
that both buy and sell CDS and wish to have a covered portfolio exposure. We consider CDS-
only portfolios and discuss in the concluding section the important extension of incorporating
the underlying sovereign bond(s) as well. The paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 reports
statistical analysis of the sovereign CDS spreads and identifies regime switching, Sect. 3
formulates models for hedgers, speculators, and dealers. Sections 4 and 5 report results
with portfolio diversification and active portfolio management, respectively. Section 6 draws
conclusions and discusses open questions.
2 Some empirical analysis of sovereign CDS markets
The choice of a model should be guided by the statistical properties of the market data.
We analyze the most liquid 5-yr CDS spreads for a sample of European core and periphery
countries, and CESEE countries, using daily observations from Datastream. For the analysis
of individual countries we use all available data going back as far as December 2007 (the
period examined is indicated on the x-axis of the figures for each country). Since not all
countries offered CDS starting in 2007, we analyze common regimes over the period 8
October 2008 to 18 March 2016 during which there were CDS for all countries in our sample.
This period starts with the sub-prime crisis in the USA, covers the beginning of the Eurozone
crisis and goes well into its endgame. Greek CDS stopped trading on 22 February 2012 after
a vertiginous ascent of its spread to 14912bp, and while we identify regime switching for
Greek CDS, we exclude it from the portfolio experiments.
2.1 Regime switching
Given significant evidence that the determinants of CDS spreads and spread returns change
with time (Cont and Kan 2011; Alexander and Kaeck 2008), we first search for regime switch-
ing and then calculate the moments in each regime. Other studies cited earlier (Augustin et al.
2014, Sect. 7.4) were searching for the factors that determine corporate CDS spreads. We
are not concerned here with identifying specific factors for sovereign CDS spreads but,
instead, with identifying discernible regimes without necessarily identifying the factors that
drove regime switches. Hence, we consider regime switching in the level of CDS spreads
with time. This analysis is sufficient for testing the main thesis of this paper that portfo-
lio diversification pays and whether the benefits are regime dependent. One could consider
different regime identification mechanisms, such as regime switching in spread returns. We
could also consider regime switching not with time but with some underlying factor, such
as market volatility, as we do in the next subsection. Identifying the common risk factors
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is a key input to risk management and here we test whether regimes are an important fac-
tor in CDS spreads and find that they are. We do not claim that we have the best way for
identifying regime switching and this open question is discussed in the concluding sec-
tion.
Using the test of Bai and Perron (1998) we identify regime changes for all countries in
our sample. The Bai-Perron test identifies multiple breaks in linear regressions. Assuming
a linear model, we identify the break points using the dynamic programming algorithm
described in Bai and Perron (2003), as implemented in the free software system R. To
avoid over-fitting we limit the maximum number of break points to five. Figures 2 and 3
show the regime breaks for core and periphery Eurozone countries. (“Appendix A” shows
findings for CESEE and Baltic countries.) Confidence intervals for the regime switching
range are small (see the discussion for the common regime switches for all countries in the
next subsection). We observe that France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Cyprus are synchronized
in their regime switching, whereas Germany, Ireland and Greece have idiosyncratic regime
changes. For instance, only Germany has a regime switch associated with the onset of the
subprime crisis and the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, while the eurozone
crisis in spring 2010 signals regime switching for all countries. This finding hints that CDS
portfolios could diversify idiosyncratic risks, motivating the portfolio optimization models
of the next section.
The first four moments, and max and min values of CDS spread returns, for different
regimes, are summarized in “Appendix B”. These estimates show that sovereign CDS spread
returns are asymmetric with fat tails, an observation exemplified for corporate CDS by Cont
and Kan (2011). This dictates the type of portfolio diversification model we use next, as the
classical mean variance models do not apply. The estimates also reveal significant changes
of the moments between regimes, implying that the optimal portfolios can be regime depen-
dent.
2.2 Common regime breaks
To test our portfolio management models we need to identify common regimes for all CDS
series. An extension of the Bai-Perron test to multivariate regressions is Qu and Perron (2007)
and we run the Bai-Qu-Perron test using GAUSS 16.0.3 on the series of Eurozone core,
periphery and Baltic countries.2 As common regressor we use the Euro Stoxx 50 Volatility
Index (VSTOXX) since volatility is a key determinant of CDS spreads and VSTOXX is
the most watched European volatility index. The test on the full set of eurozone core and
periphery, and CESEE countries, would not converge, but we found various combinations
of core, periphery and Baltic countries being stable when adding one more country. Hence,
we use the regimes identified for core, periphery and the Baltics as applying to the whole set
of countries. The results are given in Table 1 and moments are tabulated in “Appendix B”,
Tables 6 and 7. We also tested for regime switching in the spread returns, see Table 1. Regime
switching of returns leads regime switching of spread level by five months at the start of the
crisis. For the end of the crisis we can not reject the hypothesis that the regime switches were
identical for spreads and spread returns.
In testing the portfolio optimization strategies we use the regimes identified for spread
levels that have tight confidence intervals of two to four days. These regimes coincide with
phases of the eurozone crisis and we refer to them as I. Turbulent, II. Crisis and III. Post
crisis.
2 The GAUSS code is available from Zhongjun Qu as “GAUSS code: Estimating and Testing Structural
Changes in Multivariate Regressions” at http://people.bu.edu/qu/code.htm.
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Fig. 2 Regime switching identified separately for each one of these core and periphery countries appears
synchronized. Portugal is also synchronized, see Fig. 3. a France, b Italy, c Cyprus, d Spain
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Fig. 3 Regime switching identified separately for each one of these core and periphery countries appears
idiosyncratic. a Germany, b Ireland, c Portugal, d Greece
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Table 1 Common regime switching dates using Bai-Qu-Perron test with VSTOXX as a common risk factor,
and confidence intervals at the 95% level
Variable tested Regime switching date and
confidence interval
Regime switching date and
confidence interval
Spread level 25/11/2010 25/2/2013
[24/11/2010, 26/11/2010] [22/2/2013, 26/2/2013]
Spread return 22/6/2010 19/3/2013
[14/6/2010, 30/6/2010] [19/2/2013, 16/4/2013]
3 The CVaR portfolio optimization models
Given the skewed and fat-tailed returns of CDS identified by Cont et al. (2010) for corporates,
and from our own analysis above for sovereigns, we develop portfolio diversification models
using CVaR optimization. CVaR optimization has its origins in the work of Rockafellar and
Uryasev (2000, 2002) and its properties are well understood, see, e.g. Zenios (2007, Sect.
5.5). We develop single-period CVaR optimization models. Returns are measured during the
risk horizon by the log of spread changes, but do not account for collected premia or payments
in the case of default. This is a reasonable approximation for short horizons or when dealing
with sovereigns with very low probabilities of default (e.g, Germany), and extensions are
discussed in Sect. 6.
The expected value of the α-tail3 of the distribution of portfolio loss X , CVaRα(X), and
its minimization formula are given in the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (Fundamental minimization formula (Rockafellar and Uryasev 2002)) As a func-
tion of γ ∈ R, the auxiliary function
Fα(X, γ ) = γ + 11 − α E {max {X − γ, 0}}
is finite and convex, with
CVaRα(X) = min
γ∈R Fα(X, γ ).
Consider an investor operating in a market with n risky assets with rates of return denoted
by random vector ξ . For an investment vector x ∈ Rn of proportional notional allocations
to the risky assets, the loss is given by the function f (x, ξ) = −xξ . When dealing with
portfolio optimization, loss is a function of the portfolio x and we write the auxiliary function
and CVaR as functions of x . From Theorem 1 we have:
CVaRα(x) = min
γ∈R Fα(x, γ ), (1)
where
Fα(x, γ ) = γ + 11 − α E{max { f (x, ξ) − γ, 0}}.
A model for selecting a portfolio with minimum CVaR and a target expected return is:
3 α ∈ (0, 1] and all numerical experiments in this paper are carried out for α = 0.95.
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min
γ∈R,x∈X Fα(x, γ )
s.t. μx ≥ μ¯. (2)
X is the constraint set on the investment variables which specifies feasible portfolios depend-
ing on the investment strategy, μ is a vector of mean returns of risky assets, and μ¯ ∈ R is
the target expected return. γ is the Value-at-Risk of the loss function corresponding to the
minimal CVaR.
From historical data we generate an S × n matrix R of S scenarios of returns for the n
risky assets—Steps 0 in Sect. 5—and estimate μ as the n-vector of mean returns of R. From
(2) we formulate CVaR optimization models for three investment strategies:
1. Long exposures (L). This strategy uses CDS as they were originally intended to hedge
credit risk, but never, so far, employed in a portfolio context.
2. Uncovered long and short exposures (LS). This strategy is followed by speculators that
seek to exploit credit risk opportunities from deterioration (by going long) or improve-
ment (by going short) of a sovereign’s rating.
3. Covered long and short exposures (NZ). This is the strategy of dealers that both buy and
sell CDS but do not wish to be uncovered. This is a “net zero” position with no cash
outflow.
The notion of covered and uncovered exposures is context dependent. Typically a short CDS
position is covered if the investor has borrowed the underlying bond, or has entered into an
agreement to borrow the bond, or has an arrangement that guarantees the bond can be made
available. In the world of dealers an exposure is covered if there are as many long positions
as there are short, and this is how we use the term here.
3.1 Long exposures
The constraint set on the investment variables in the simplest model stipulates only that all
variables are non-negative (i.e., no short sales allowed) with a normalization constraint that
asset allocations add up to an initial endowment of 1:
XL = {x ∈ Rn | x ≥ 0,
n∑
i=1
xi = 1}. (3)
The CVaR portfolio optimization model is given by
min
x∈XL , u∈RS , γ∈R
γ + 1
S(1 − α)e
u (4)
s.t.
−Rx − u − eγ ≤ 0
μx ≥ μ¯
u ≥ 0,
where e is a vector of all 1 and u is a dummy variable that transforms the argument of the
minimization problem (1) from a discontinuous function with a max operator to a system of
linear equations and inequalities as in Krokhmal et al. (2002)—for explanations see Zenios
(2007, Sect. 5.5)—to obtain a linear programming problem.
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3.2 Uncovered long and short exposures
We introduce non-negative variables x+ and x− to represent long and short positions, respec-
tively. An initial endowment of 1 is invested in long positions, but the long positions can be
augmented from capital raised from short sales. We set an (arbitrary) limit that no single short
position can be higher than our original endowment, but overall there is no guarantee that the
aggregate short positions will not be significantly higher that the original endowment. The
difference between the original endowment and the aggregate short position (if negative) is
a proxy for the margin requirement for the investor to sell CDS protection. The constraint
set on the investment variables is given by
XL S = {x ∈ Rn | x = x+ − x−, 0 ≤ x+ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ x− ≤ 1,
n∑
i=1
(x+i − x−i ) = 1}. (5)
The CVaR portfolio optimization model is formulated as:
min
x∈XL S , u∈RS , γ∈R
γ + 1
S(1 − α)e
u (6)
s.t.
−Rx+ + Rx− − u − eγ ≤ 0
μx+ − μx− ≥ μ¯
u ≥ 0.
3.3 Covered long and short exposures
We impose now a constraint that total short exposure is equal to total long exposure, so that
we have a position with net zero cash outflow. The endowment of 1 unit is considered as
collateral. The constraint set is given by
XN Z = {x ∈ Rn | x = x+ − x−, 0 ≤ x+ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ x− ≤ 1,
n∑
i=1
x+i = 1,
n∑
i=1
x−i = 1}.
(7)
The portfolio optimization model is obtained by substituting XL S in model (6) by XN Z .
3.4 Notes on implementation
Some details on model implementation and testing are in order.
1. The models minimize the CVaR of portfolio return subject to meeting or exceeding a
target μ¯ on expected return μx . Varying the target we trace an efficient frontier trading
off risk (CVaR) versus reward (expected return), both measured in percentages. We report
CVaR with a minus sign since it measures losses.
2. The models can incorporate linearly proportional transaction costs (Zenios 2007, pp.
80–81), and numerical experiments are carried out with transaction cost 0.5%.
3. To carry out testing consistently with the models, whereby defaults are not modeled,
Greece was excluded since it defaulted during the testing period.
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4 Portfolio diversification
The models are now employed to develop frontiers for the three investment strategies. The S
scenarios of returns are taken as the realizations of historical data observed during the time
period of interest. We develop efficient frontiers for the whole period and for each one of the
regimes separately.
4.1 Diversification pays
Figure 4 shows efficient frontiers for the whole time period October 2008–March 2016
with the three investment strategies. The following observations support the argument that
diversification pays:
1. None of the frontiers are flat over the whole range of target expected returns, with the
sole exception of the frontier including all countries using the LS strategy. Hence, there
are trade-offs between risk and rewards in the CDS market.
2. We note Pareto improvements in the efficient frontiers when diversifying from core
to CESEE and/or periphery countries. Hence, investors benefited by diversifying their
portfolios from core to the riskier periphery and CESEE countries.
3. Pareto improvements are more pronounced when considering all countries together. This
is particularly noticeable when using strategies LS and NZ, see Fig. 4b, c, further sup-
porting diversification across regions.
Drawing the efficient frontiers for the different strategies together in Fig. 5 we observe
that (as expected) strategy L is the least efficient, whereas LS achieves the highest expected
return but at higher risk. Strategy NZ dominates the other two at low risk levels, but limits
the high expected return associated with high downside potential of the LS position. We also
demonstrate that there exists a zero risk position with the NZ strategy.
The results show that diversification consistently pays. However, the relative positions of
the frontiers may change with the regimes and we explore this issue next.
4.2 Diversification is regime dependent
To study the effect of regime switching on portfolio diversification we develop efficient
frontiers for each regime separately. Figure 6 illustrates changes in the relative position of
the frontiers for each country group with the regimes, when using the NZ strategy. (Similar
results are shown in “Appendix C” for strategies L and LS.) Figure 7 illustrates the relative
position of the frontiers obtained using different strategies for all countries under the different
regimes. The following observations can be made from these results:
1. Diversification pays consistently in all regimes, see Fig. 6, and this is a robustness test
of the “diversification pays” thesis of the previous subsection.
2. The relative performance of the three strategies remains unaltered among regimes, see
Fig. 7. The observation that NZ dominates at low risk levels, but LS dominates are high
risk is robust to regime changes.
3. The relative efficiency of portfolios in the different country groups changes with the
regimes. For instance, the results of Fig. 6a show that before the crisis it paid to diversify
from the core to CESEE and/or periphery countries, with a small advantage of CESEE
over periphery. The relative advantage of CESEE over periphery is blurred during the
crisis, Fig. 6b, and the CESEE countries clearly dominate post-crisis, Fig. 6c.
123
Ann Oper Res
−12% −11% −10%  −9%  −8%  −7%  −6%  −5%  −4%
−0.05%
    0%
 0.05%
  0.1%
CVaR
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 R
et
ur
n
Efficient Frontier
Core
Periphery
CESEE
All
−35% −30% −25% −20% −15% −10%  −5%   0%
−0.1%
   0%
 0.1%
 0.2%
 0.3%
 0.4%
 0.5%
 0.6%
CVaR
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 R
et
ur
n
Efficient Frontier
Core
Periphery
CESEE
All
−14% −12% −10%  −8%  −6%  −4%  −2%   0%
   0%
0.02%
0.04%
0.06%
0.08%
 0.1%
0.12%
0.14%
0.16%
0.18%
 0.2%
CVaR
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 R
et
ur
n
Efficient Frontier
Core
Periphery
CESEE
All
(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 4 Efficient frontiers with different investment strategies over the whole period October 2008–March 2016
showing the benefits of geographical diversification of CDS portfolios for all strategies. a Long exposures, b
uncovered long and short exposures, c covered long and short exposures
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Fig. 5 Comparing the efficient frontiers of the different investment strategies over the whole period October
2008–March 2016 shows the relative merits of each strategy: the L strategy is dominated whereas LS and NZ
perform better when going from higher to lower risk appetite, respectively
The main conclusion from these observations is that diversification pays for all strategies
and in all regimes. Also the relative merits of the LS and NZ strategies are robust to regime
changes. However, the regimes change the diversified portfolio. Therefore expectations about
the regimes should be included in the diversification models, and this issue is addressed in
the concluding section.
5 Active portfolio management
Testing was so far carried out in a static setting whereby a diversified portfolio was created
and held throughout the investment period. In practice, diversified portfolios are revised as
new information arrives and the models are now tested using active portfolio management.
Testing proceeds as follows:
Step 0. Use the first 500 days of data from 8 October 2008 to 8 September 2010 (call this
date t) to generate the scenario return matrix R.
Step 1. Run the CVaR models and choose a portfolio from the efficient frontier.
Step 2. Move the clock to t + 1, and record the ex post portfolio return from t to t + 1.
Step 3. Update the scenario return matrix by adding the observed market returns from t
to t + 1 and removing the oldest observation, and return to Step 1.
This active management strategy is repeated for 1442 daily steps from 9 September 2010
to 18 March 2016. This five-year period covers the Eurozone crisis with the three regimes
identified in Sect. 2. Instead of reporting returns for each period we equivalently report
cumulative wealth starting with an initial endowment of 100. We pick portfolios on the
efficient frontier with increasing risk appetite: (1) the portfolio that minimizes CVaR, with
expected return denoted by Rmin , (2) the portfolio with target expected return half-way
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Fig. 6 Regime dependent relative position of efficient frontiers for each country group using strategy NZ. a
Regime I. Turbulent, b Regime II. Crisis, c Regime III. Post crisis
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Fig. 7 The relative positions of efficient frontiers using different investment strategies are robust to regime
switching. a Regime I. Turbulent, b Regime II. Crisis, c Regime III. Post crisis
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Fig. 8 The S&P/ISDA Eurozone Developed Nation Sovereign CDS index
between Rmin and the maximum expected return Rmax , denoted by Rmid , (3) the portfolio
with target expected return 12 (Rmid + Rmax ), (4) the portfolio that maximizes expected
return Rmax . As a benchmark we use the S&P/ISDA Eurozone Developed Nation Sovereign
CDS index, illustrated in Fig. 8. Results with active portfolio management using the three
investment strategies are shown in Fig. 9. Also shown as a reference is the cumulative wealth
of an investment in the risk-free rate taken to be the yield of AAA-rated 3-month sovereigns.
Several observations are drawn from these figures:
1. All strategies can deliver overall positive returns for the whole period. Investors with
average risk appetite (target expected return Rmid ) achieved overall annualized return of
5.65% (strategyL) and 10.35% (strategyNZ). Using strategyLSwith the same level of risk
appetite generates loses −5.56%. However, if the risk appetite is set higher, consistently
with the LS strategy, by increasing the expected target return to 12 (Rmid + Rmax ), then
return turns positive 5.22%. These results compare favorably with the annualized return
of 0% for the benchmark AAA-rated bond and −13.54% of the index.
2. Investment strategies L and LS have volatile returns (LS more than L).
3. Increasing the risk appetite by setting target expected return to 12 (Rmid + Rmax ), from
Rmin , improves the performance of actively managed portfolios. However, the situation
deteriorates as risk appetite increases further by setting the target at Rmax . Hence, neither
too little (Rmin) nor too much (Rmax ) risk serves best the investor. This exemplifies the
need for risk management models carefully calibrated to CDS spread dynamics.
4. Strategy NZ performs uniformly well. It generates less volatile returns than the other two
strategies and rides smoothly past the big up- and down-swings of the crisis. For medium
risk appetite this strategy achieves returns of 10.35%–18.17%. It is only when ignoring
totally the CVaR risk criterion, by setting expected return to Rmax , that this strategy ends
up very close to zero cumulative return and eventually registers loss of −6.88% at the
end of the testing period.
5. The models generate overall well diversified portfolios. Counting the number of assets
in each portfolio at each point in time we have the following averages over the testing
period, rounded to the nearest integer:
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Fig. 9 Wealth accumulation with active portfolio management of sovereign CDS over the period September
2010–March 2016. a Long exposures, b uncovered long and short exposures, c covered long and short exposures
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Strategy L 6 assets (ranging from 4 to 10)
Strategy LS 8 assets (ranging from 5 to 12)
Strategy NZ 15 assets (ranging from 10 to 18)
The average Gini coefficient of asset holdings is 0.5 for all strategies, which indicates
balanced distribution of holdings among the selected assets. With 18 available assets
we consider portfolios of 6 to 15 assets, on average, as well diversified. For strategy L
there were trading days when the model selected portfolios with 4 to 5 assets. These
portfolios can not be considered well-diversified but they occur very rarely—for about
a dozen trading days during the five years. Ad hoc constraints can be added to ensure a
minimum number of assets in the portfolio, but since they are rarely needed they will not
alter materially the model performance.
Since returns are volatile it is not sufficient to look at the total return, even if it is positive
and higher than the index. Hence, we compute the Sharpe ratio for each strategy and compare
it with the Sharpe ratio of the index. We compute the ratio suggested by Sharpe (1994) and
the ratio that penalizes only downside risk (Ziemba 2005). Sharpe ratios are reported on an
annual basis and are consistent with the daily ratios that we also computed but do not report.
The Sharpe ratios in Table 2 confirm the relative merits of the different strategies and the
significant out-performance of the optimized strategies over the index.
We also tested active portfolio management with weekly portfolio rebalancing (we thank a
referee for suggesting this test). Sharpe ratios using the NZ strategy with weekly revisions are
given in Table 2 and they are uniformly better than the Sharpe ratios of the daily rebalanced
strategy. This improvement can be explained by the reduction in transaction costs with less
frequent weekly rebalancing. However, it is not clear beforehand if a daily or weekly (or
monthly) revision is the most effective. In dynamic multi-period stochastic programming
models for asset allocation the portfolio rebalancing is carried out as frequently as optimally
necessary (Zenios et al. 1998; Mulvey and Vladimirou 1992), but in a single-period model the
length of the time period has to be determined a priori and there is no good way for doing so.
6 Conclusions and open questions
The paper modeled CDS portfolio problems using optimization of a risk measure (CVaR)
to capture the empirically observed characteristics of CDS spread returns. Three portfolio
strategies were modeled and tested empirically using long positions, long and short positions,
and covered long and short positions. Empirical analysis of CDS spreads going back before
the start of the global financial crisis of 2008 reveals that they are subject to regime switching
and the models were tested separately for each regime and for all regimes together.
Testing was carried out over the highly volatile period that covers the eurozone crisis and
using data from eurozone core and periphery, and CESEE countries. One set of tests used
a static approach for building diversified portfolios and tracing the efficient frontier. Results
uniformly show that diversification pays. While the precise type of diversification may be
regime dependent, the observation that diversification pays is robust across regimes and for
all three portfolio strategies. A second set of tests used the models for active CDS portfolio
management. Results establish that the model-selected portfolios outperform, ex post, the
broad market index. Investors’ risk appetite has an impact on results, but except for extremely
conservative or extremely risky choices, the diversified portfolios consistently dominate.
While the paper contributes several innovations on an important problem, it also identifies
questions for further research. First, an extension of great practical significance is to incorpo-
rate the underlying sovereign bond(s) in the models. CDS are often used to hedge default risk
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Table 2 Sharpe ratios for active management using the three portfolio optimization strategies and for the
S&P/ISDA Eurozone Developed Nation Sovereign CDS index
Strategy and rebalancing frequency Sharpe ratio (Sharpe 1994) Sharpe ratio (Ziemba 2005)
Long positions (L), daily
Target expected return Rmin −0.055 −0.068
Target expected return Rmid 0.275 0.445
Target expected return 12 (Rmid + Rmax ) 0.275 0.451
Target expected return Rmax 0.091 0.121
Uncovered Long-Short positions (LS), daily
Target expected return Rmin −0.186 −0.220
Target expected return Rmid 0.106 0.147
Target expected return 12 (Rmid + Rmax ) 0.276 0.446
Target expected return Rmax 0.091 0.121
Covered Long-Short positions (NZ), daily
Target expected return Rmin −0.503 −0.428
Target expected return Rmid 0.306 0.518
Target expected return 12 (Rmid + Rmax ) 0.355 0.603
Target expected return Rmax 0.112 0.159
Covered Long-Short positions (NZ), weekly
Target expected return Rmin −0.440 −0.428
Target expected return Rmid 0.457 0.871
Target expected return 12 (Rmid + Rmax ) 0.428 0.809
Target expected return Rmax 0.134 0.185
S&P/ISDA Eurozone Developed CDS Index −0.304 −0.355
of an underlying sovereign bond portfolio, and CDS and bond portfolios should be integrated
(Holmer and Zenios 1995). The models can incorporate bonds as one more asset class, but
additional work is needed to generate scenarios of CDS returns that are consistent with the
bond returns. To do so we need to capture the correlations between bond yields and CDS
spreads. Second, the models do not account for collected premia or payments in the case of
default. This highlights the major limitation of our models, which are single-period. In the
single period context we can not explicitly model events other than changes in CDS spread
returns. To the extent that returns capture credit and liquidity risk, the models work fine.
But if there is a liquidity break, like with some eurozone crisis countries, the model has no
direct way of dealing with it. A multi-period extension using stochastic programming could
deal with default. Allowing for the eventuality of default also allows us to consider situa-
tions arising during crises whereby lack of liquidity in the markets renders these instruments
ineffective for hedging. This is a topic for future research for which we have precedence in
the literature for modeling defaults on credit derivatives (Schönbucher 2003) and the multi-
period stochastic programming model with default for corporate bonds (Jobst et al. 2006).
Third, it is natural to introduce regime switching in the scenarios of the optimization models.
Our models treat all scenarios the same and there is no explicit modeling of regime-switching.
Since the models of this paper are scenario-based they can incorporate regime scenarios as
well. However, generating such scenarios is difficult, given the limited history of regime
switching observations. There is a long history of modeling regime switching in financial
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times series starting with the seminal work of Hamilton (1994), and a model for regime
switching in CDS spreads is given in Consiglio et al. (2016). Diversification with regime
switching is better represented with multi-period models to capture regime persistence, and
this is another promising direction for future research.
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Appendix A: Regime switching in the CDS spread levels of CESEE and
Baltic countries
See Figs. 10 and 11.
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Fig. 10 Regime switching appears synchronized for these CESEE countries. a Bulgaria, b Croatia, c Czech
Republic, d Hungary, e Poland, f Romania, g Slovakia, h Slovenia
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Fig. 11 Regime switching appears idiosyncratic for the Baltic countries. a Estonia, b Latvia, c Lithuania
123
Ann Oper Res
Appendix B: CDS spread moments of all country groups under different
regimes
See Tables 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7.
Table 3 CDS spread return moment estimates during each regime for eurozone core and periphery countries
Country-regime Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis Max Min
France
21/12/07–26/03/10 0.25 5.72 0.98 11.20 37.47 −21.85
29/03/10–21/06/11 0.15 4.87 −0.04 5.64 18.44 −20.53
22/06/11–13/09/12 0.03 6.22 −0.01 4.46 19.18 −23.08
14/09/12–09/12/13 −0.21 3.49 −1.06 16.86 17.14 −23.39
10/12/13–18/03/16 −0.07 4.01 0.47 10.55 25.36 −18.49
Germany
21/12/07–13/03/09 0.78 5.48 2.82 28.86 52.48 −17.44
16/03/09–20/06/11 −0.18 5.48 −0.57 10.58 24.92 −37.14
21/06/11–12/09/12 −0.02 6.24 0.54 6.26 31.87 −21.04
13/09/12–02/12/14 −0.13 3.95 −0.23 12.16 23.12 −23.12
03/12/14–18/03/16 −0.00 6.31 −0.02 7.39 25.76 −25.07
Italy
14/12/07–29/03/10 0.29 5.01 0.02 13.95 33.86 −37.12
30/03/10–07/07/11 0.18 6.51 −0.84 10.39 20.97 −45.20
08/07/11–02/10/12 0.13 4.94 0.34 5.55 22.20 −16.27
03/10/12–27/12/13 −0.19 2.91 0.38 8.20 15.68 −14.68
30/12/13–18/03/16 −0.08 3.67 0.38 7.98 23.39 −16.15
Ireland
08/10/08–20/09/10 0.34 5.41 0.20 8.32 25.37 −33.11
21/09/10–15/08/12 −0.00 3.08 −0.26 6.08 13.11 −13.47
16/08/12–26/09/13 −0.43 3.93 −1.11 15.49 17.48 −22.15
27/09/13–07/11/14 −0.30 2.19 −2.64 21.33 6.13 −18.08
10/11/14–18/03/16 −0.01 1.69 1.57 13.96 11.43 −7.12
Cyprus
14/12/07–30/04/10 0.37 4.40 0.51 22.11 26.24 −33.65
03/05/10–27/07/11 0.51 4.55 3.41 32.69 40.68 −20.91
28/07/11–22/10/12 0.12 3.72 2.90 49.28 36.27 −27.07
23/10/12–07/02/14 −0.11 3.00 −0.49 31.65 19.79 −26.14
10/02/14–18/03/16 −0.15 3.19 1.28 44.46 33.46 −29.74
Portugal
12/02/08–16/03/10 0.20 4.61 0.28 5.62 17.70 −17.65
17/03/10–02/06/11 0.54 6.59 −2.28 24.99 27.42 −59.00
03/06/11–20/08/12 −0.00 4.09 0.37 7.65 21.28 −17.61
21/08/12–03/01/14 −0.22 2.85 0.86 11.45 18.95 −11.79
06/01/14–18/03/16 −0.08 3.84 0.62 6.07 17.32 −14.28
Spain
14/12/07–12/04/10 0.32 5.17 0.10 10.34 33.85 −30.13
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Table 3 continued
Country-regime Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis Max Min
13/04/10–07/07/11 0.24 6.26 −0.63 10.17 28.26 −41.75
08/07/11–02/10/12 0.04 4.83 0.03 5.92 21.66 −19.35
03/10/12–27/12/13 −0.24 2.94 −0.01 6.89 11.79 −15.28
30/12/13–18/03/16 −0.11 3.97 0.54 8.26 25.10 −18.41
Greece
14/12/07–20/04/10 0.54 4.45 0.33 9.03 24.54 −23.65
21/04/10–06/07/11 0.51 5.20 −2.51 37.50 22.26 −52.20
07/07/11–22/02/12 0.89 8.05 −0.41 6.73 26.78 −37.83
Table 4 CDS spread return moment estimates during each regime for CESEE countries
Country-regime Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis Max Min
Bulgaria
29/02/08–24/07/09 0.15 5.70 6.45 84.09 74.45 −21.19
27/07/09–22/06/11 −0.07 3.69 0.76 14.52 29.19 −22.31
23/06/11–10/09/12 −0.02 3.02 −0.18 6.61 11.92 −15.45
11/09/12–09/12/14 −0.07 2.22 −0.36 29.36 17.34 −20.94
10/12/14–15/04/16 0.03 1.63 3.65 53.57 17.54 −9.73
Croatia
29/02/08–22/07/11 0.11 4.94 6.28 116.34 87.50 −24.89
25/07/11–10/10/12 0.03 2.46 1.14 11.18 17.06 −7.46
11/10/12–12/05/14 −0.00 1.69 −1.31 17.24 8.33 −13.54
13/05/14–15/04/16 −0.02 1.16 −0.26 19.70 8.38 −8.00
Czech Republic
29/02/08–22/07/09 0.23 8.05 1.85 26.80 68.94 −46.26
23/07/09–14/07/11 −0.04 4.13 0.13 17.54 30.23 −31.85
15/07/11–02/10/12 −0.02 3.61 1.11 12.90 21.74 −17.92
03/10/12–12/05/14 −0.09 1.43 0.21 17.35 9.61 −8.36
13/05/14–15/04/16 −0.07 1.35 0.21 47.75 13.97 −12.41
Hungary
14/12/07–12/03/09 0.78 6.77 5.54 56.67 75.62 −20.06
13/03/09–13/07/11 −0.12 3.63 0.85 15.06 27.25 −24.05
14/07/11–11/10/12 0.02 2.77 0.04 4.60 10.59 −9.47
12/10/12–25/04/14 −0.08 2.61 0.69 43.84 26.01 −23.29
28/04/14–15/04/16 −0.08 1.46 0.17 8.94 7.61 −5.93
Poland
29/02/08–22/07/09 0.25 8.64 4.52 74.83 105.40 −65.39
23/07/09–20/06/11 −0.03 4.29 −0.71 14.20 24.54 −33.65
21/06/11–06/09/12 −0.04 3.46 −0.21 4.89 10.77 −13.58
07/09/12–26/12/13 −0.16 2.64 1.79 21.19 20.72 −13.09
27/12/13–15/04/16 0.01 1.93 −1.39 43.89 16.27 −21.26
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Table 4 continued
Country-regime Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis Max Min
Romania
29/02/08–21/07/09 0.13 5.57 2.13 25.53 39.67 −33.93
22/07/09–21/07/11 −0.08 3.23 0.15 12.75 22.53 −22.29
22/07/11–09/10/12 0.03 2.72 0.37 5.85 11.39 −9.11
10/10/12–25/04/14 −0.12 1.61 −0.06 22.63 12.27 −11.91
28/04/14–15/04/16 −0.07 1.15 −0.44 11.91 6.54 −5.82
Slovakia
08/10/08–20/11/09 0.02 7.77 0.48 14.47 46.05 −44.63
23/11/09–05/08/11 0.11 4.78 0.14 10.92 24.85 −28.77
08/08/11–20/09/12 0.03 4.34 0.88 12.33 27.57 −19.60
21/09/12–26/03/14 −0.16 1.66 −1.69 31.64 9.30 −14.45
27/03/14–15/04/16 −0.11 1.43 −2.40 26.66 7.35 −13.56
Slovenia
14/12/07–17/05/10 0.33 7.11 1.17 17.37 55.96 −36.10
18/05/10–16/09/11 0.29 3.82 1.19 10.51 20.76 −11.78
19/09/11–17/12/12 0.10 2.99 0.12 13.94 14.47 −18.83
18/12/12–18/03/14 −0.11 2.49 1.11 13.84 14.38 −11.03
19/03/14–15/04/16 −0.11 1.49 0.10 13.96 8.76 −8.33
Table 5 CDS spread return moment estimates during each regime for the Baltic countries
Country-regime Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis Max Min
Estonia
08/10/08–20/11/09 −0.10 5.84 1.56 18.12 42.17 −28.39
23/11/09–03/10/12 −0.13 3.25 −0.02 12.59 20.07 −19.31
04/10/12–15/04/16 −0.04 1.16 0.02 27.38 9.41 −8.92
Latvia
08/10/08–20/11/09 0.12 5.46 0.34 10.86 30.50 −24.67
23/11/09–06/01/11 −0.29 2.64 −0.43 7.72 12.22 −14.11
07/01/11–12/09/12 −0.06 2.27 0.73 8.05 11.35 −10.42
13/09/12–06/06/14 −0.10 1.57 −2.61 42.88 10.63 −17.02
09/06/14–15/04/16 −0.10 1.88 −2.90 44.89 11.68 −21.62
Lithuania
08/10/08–20/11/09 0.05 5.73 0.98 24.55 43.08 −38.53
23/11/09–06/01/11 −0.13 3.38 −0.28 9.18 15.68 −18.23
07/01/11–03/09/12 −0.05 2.28 0.10 7.10 10.80 −10.11
04/09/12–05/06/14 −0.10 1.40 −0.27 17.50 10.65 −8.88
06/06/14–15/04/16 −0.10 1.59 −5.67 96.75 9.53 −23.02
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Table 6 CDS spread return statistics for eurozone core and periphery countries under the common regimes
Country-regime Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis Max Min
Regime I. Turbulent
France 0.16 5.58 0.46 7.77 36.10 −21.51
Germany 0.05 5.26 −0.26 7.69 24.92 −28.86
Italy 0.18 6.16 −0.63 13.03 33.86 −45.20
Ireland 0.38 5.32 0.19 8.26 25.37 −33.11
Cyprus 0.23 3.85 0.48 34.32 26.24 −33.65
Portugal 0.33 6.15 −1.44 19.61 27.42 −59.00
Spain 0.24 6.30 −0.30 10.01 33.85 −41.75
Regime II. Crisis
France −0.08 5.44 −0.07 6.06 19.18 −23.39
Germany −0.07 5.91 −0.03 8.72 31.87 −37.14
Italy 0.05 4.96 0.17 5.28 22.20 −21.37
Ireland −0.24 3.68 −0.86 12.08 17.48 −22.15
Cyprus 0.29 4.28 3.16 37.75 40.68 −27.07
Portugal −0.03 3.88 −0.02 7.99 21.28 −21.00
Spain −0.02 4.68 −0.14 5.57 21.66 −19.35
Regime III. Post-crisis
France −0.10 3.64 0.48 11.86 25.36 −18.49
Germany −0.07 4.96 0.01 10.79 25.76 −25.07
Italy −0.10 3.40 0.52 8.75 23.39 −16.15
Ireland −0.14 1.88 −1.06 19.65 11.43 −18.08
Cyprus −0.15 3.13 0.45 42.14 33.46 −29.74
Portugal −0.07 3.58 0.77 7.36 18.95 −14.28
Spain −0.15 3.66 0.59 8.79 25.10 −18.41
Table 7 CDS spread return statistics for CESEE and Baltic countries under the common regimes
Country-regime Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis Max Min
Regime I. Turbulent
Bulgaria −0.06 4.60 0.86 12.07 30.41 −22.31
Croatia 0.00 4.63 0.08 10.01 23.24 −24.89
Czech Republic 0.04 6.76 0.24 17.99 46.81 −46.26
Hungary 0.05 5.07 1.86 21.29 46.23 −24.05
Poland −0.01 6.42 −0.87 32.07 53.24 −65.39
Romania −0.02 4.81 0.98 22.80 39.67 −33.93
Slovakia −0.01 6.53 0.41 17.21 46.05 −44.63
Slovenia −0.00 6.14 1.30 22.23 55.96 −36.10
Estonia −0.23 5.05 1.22 18.58 42.17 −28.39
Latvia −0.07 4.38 0.39 14.33 30.50 −24.67
Lithuania −0.04 4.80 0.86 27.50 43.08 −38.53
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Table 7 continued
Country-regime Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis Max Min
Regime II. Crisis
Bulgaria −0.10 2.91 −0.62 10.42 11.92 −20.94
Croatia 0.05 2.37 0.30 10.85 17.06 −13.54
Czech Republic −0.07 2.97 1.17 16.19 21.74 −17.92
Hungary −0.01 2.58 −0.02 5.68 10.59 −11.66
Poland −0.06 3.03 −0.14 6.07 10.77 −13.58
Romania −0.08 2.50 0.05 7.09 11.39 −11.91
Slovakia 0.05 4.19 0.70 10.62 27.57 −19.60
Slovenia 0.24 3.37 0.65 10.91 17.75 −18.83
Estonia −0.08 2.60 0.60 19.60 20.07 −19.31
Latvia −0.15 2.31 −0.09 12.40 11.35 −17.02
Lithuania −0.14 2.19 −0.11 7.50 10.80 −10.11
Regime III. Post-crisis
Bulgaria 0.03 1.73 2.91 42.79 17.54 −10.47
Croatia −0.00 1.30 0.17 15.09 8.38 −8.00
Czech Republic −0.03 1.33 0.48 39.93 13.97 −12.41
Hungary −0.09 2.02 1.05 60.05 26.01 −23.29
Poland −0.01 2.19 0.77 36.19 20.72 −21.26
Romania −0.06 1.25 1.27 20.71 12.27 −5.82
Slovakia −0.09 1.36 −1.40 30.05 9.30 −13.56
Slovenia −0.11 1.83 1.00 17.66 14.38 −11.03
Estonia 0.01 1.07 1.60 31.29 9.41 −7.33
Latvia −0.05 1.57 −3.10 57.57 11.68 −21.62
Lithuania −0.04 1.45 −4.08 88.89 10.65 −23.02
Appendix C: Efficient frontiers under different regimes
See Figs. 12 and 13.
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Fig. 12 The relative position of efficient frontiers for each country group using strategyL is regime dependent.
a Regime I. Turbulent, b Regime II. Crisis, c Regime III. Post crisis
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Fig. 13 The relative position of efficient frontiers for each country group using strategy LS is regime depen-
dent. a Regime I. Turbulent, b Regime II. Crisis, c Regime III. Post crisis
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